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I. INTRODUCTION
Since before the time Gutenberg invented the printing press, centuries
of jurisprudence have been devoted to and predicated upon paper-based
systems of communication, particularly in the area of commercial law. With
advances in technology and the implementation of electronic modes of
communication in businesses and market places in general, however, the
world has begun to move away from paper as the primary mode of
communication and the primary method of doing business.' This continues
the process begun with the introduction of the telegram and the telephone,
both of which contributed to the elimination of paper in the conduct of
business negotiations.
Electronic commerce, however, is fundamentally different from either
telephonic or paper-based commerce. First, there is no tangible piece of
paper that one can treat as the final expression of the parties' intent; reliance
must be placed upon electronic messages, which are either stored in an
electronic medium or, in the case of risk-averse business people, printed out at
1. According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

("OECD"), the volume of electronic commerce may rise to $1 trillion by 2005. Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development, The Economic and Social Impacts of
Electronic Commerce: Preliminary Findings and Research Agenda, ch. 1 (1998)
<http://www.oecd.org/subject/e-commerce/summary.htn>; see generally Id. at ch. 3. See
generally U.S. Department of Commerce, The Emerging Digital Economy (1998)
<www.doc.gov/ecommerce/EmergingDig.pdf>.
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one end. Second, the electronic message is often generated by a computer and
may not provide the typical indicia of trustworthiness. For example, with paper,
we can recognize the handwriting, identify the stationery, check the postmark
and address, and check for visible changes to the writing. On the telephone, we
can recognize the voice and verify the number we are calling. Third, commercial
transactions have traditionally required time and, frequently, additional verifiable
information for completion. For example, in the sale of goods, the time between
the execution of the sales agreement and the ultimate shipment or delivery of
goods allows for verification of creditworthiness and of other information such
as shipment details. Electronic transactions, on the other hand, are often executed
online instantaneously between computers, and the ability to verify the identity of
the parties and other information is radically reduced. Indeed, one emerging
characteristic of much of electronic commerce, such as the web-based
transaction, is the transitory nature of the relationship between the parties. Last,
the tangible nature of the transaction, e.g., the sale of goods, has allowed for
security measures such as the creation and potential enforcement of security
interests in the property that was sold. By contrast, the subject matter of
electronic commerce is increasingly intangible,2 reducing the ability to monitor
and enforce the obligations of the other party.3

2. Although tangible goods are frequently sold in electronic commerce, online
transactions involving intangibles such as software and information are multiplying. On the
emergence of a new species of property, information, as one important aspect of the development of electronic commerce, see Amelia H. Boss, The Emerging Law of International
ElectronicCommerce, 6 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 293, 298-300 (1992); Katherine Mahoney,
Information as a Commodity: New Imperatives of Commercial Law, 55 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 77, 103 (1992); Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia Ann Krauthaus, Electronic
Commerce: New Paradigmsin Information Law, 31 IDAHO L. REv. 937, 937 (1995); Margaret
Jane Radin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 L.J. & CoM. 509, 511-13 (1996). The increasing predominance of information as the subject matter of the deal has given rise to efforts
to create legal structures accommodating these new transactions, the main one of which has
been the drafting of a new article to the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2B, to cover
transactions in software and information, see U.C.C. art. 2B (Proposed Draft Dec. 1998),
available at <http:www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc.htm#UCC2B>, or, alternatively, computer
information transactions. See U.C.C. art. 2B (Proposed Draft Feb. 1, 1999), available at
<http:www.law.upenn.edu/bllIulc/ulc.htm#UCC2B>. Evolution of new types of transactions
creates concern about the rules applicable to those transactions, and concomitantly, there is
some desire for certainty and predictability in developing a legal framework. As with the case
of electronic contracting, which is discussed in this article, there are instances where the
demand for such rules may be misplaced, arising from the assumption that only positive law
may create an environment where transactions may be trusted.
3. Traditional factors in commercial transactions that contribute to amicable and
effective resolution of disputes, e.g., ongoing relationships between the parties, sufficient time
to structure the transaction, and potential collateral, are often absent in online transactions.
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The emergence of electronic commerce has raised a host of questions
about our existing rules and legal system. One frequent plea is to remove the
barriers to electronic commerce, barriers that are, to a great degree, the
vestiges of a commercial law system based on paper. Legal requirements,
such as those for a "writing," a "signature," and an "original" need to be
reconsidered in the context of electronic commerce. Efforts are underway to
respond to these demands in the following ways: in the domestic arena, the
Uniform Commercial Code4 and the proposed Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act ("UETA"); 5 and on the international level, the formulation
of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL") Model Law on Electronic Commerce. 6
4. Pending revisions to Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, as well as the
pending proposal to include computer information transactions in a new Article 2B, include
provisions addressing the application of such requirements in an electronic environment. See
Raymond T. Nimmer, Article 2B: An Introduction, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
211, 227-37 (1997) (reviewing electronic and online commerce provisions of Article 2B);
Raymond T. Nimmer, Electronic Contracting:Legal Issues, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 211, 212 (1996); Amelia H. Boss, Electronic Commerce and the Symbiotic
Relationship Between Internationaland Domestic Law Reform, 72 TULANE L. REV. 1931,
1956-63 (1998) (reviewing the changes being made in Article 2B and the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act to accommodate electronic commerce). Other completed revisions to the
Code do so through a variety of techniques. Article 5, for example, adopts terms such as
"record" in place of "writing" and contemplates presentation of non-paper documents. See
U.C.C. § 5-102 (a)(14) (1997) (defining record); id. § 5-102(a)(6) (defining document to
include presentation in any media permitted by the letter of credit or standard practice); id. §
5-102 cmt. 2 (revised Article 5 "contemplates and facilitates the growing recognition of
electronic and other nonpaper media as 'documents"'). See also R. David Whitaker, Letters of
Credit and Electronic Commerce, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 699, 699-701 (1995). Article 8
eliminates any statute of frauds writing requirement for contracts transferring interests in
securities. See James S. Rogers, An Essay on Horseless Carriagesand PaperlessNegotiable
Instruments: Some Lessons From the Article 8 Revision, 31 IDAHO L. REv. 689, 691 (1995);
U.C.C. § 8-113 (1997). Completed in 1999, revised article 9 also uses the terms "record" and
"authenticate" in place of "writing" and "signed." U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(7) (authenticate); id. §
9-102(a)(69) (record).
5. Currently scheduled for completion in August of 1999, the Act contains electronic
contracting rules for transactions outside the scope of the Uniform Commercial Code. See
Uniform Law Commissioners Drafts <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulclulc.htm> (for drafts
of the UETA).
6. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") has
taken the lead at the international level in formulating the law governing electronic commerce,
and in 1996, it gave its final approval to a new Model Law on Electronic Commerce which
contains many provisions adapting the formalities of the law to an electronic environment.
See REPORT OF THE UNrrED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW ON THE
WORK OF rrs TWENTY-NINTH SESSION, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N.Doc.
A/51/17 Annex I (1996), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 200 (1997). See Amelia H. Boss & Jane
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In many arenas, however, demands are being made on legislators and
lawmakers to go beyond mere removal of legal barriers and to "support" the
development of electronic commerce by the establishment of a legal
framework that encourages and promotes its use. The argument is that the
law should build confidence in the system by providing rules that support
and promote these new ways of doing business.
In many respects, these demands are quite understandable, as they
combine two needs. The first is the perceived need for rules to guide
conduct on the Internet. The public and the press have in recent years
become so enamored of technology that they use phrases such as
"revolutionary" to describe it. The characterization of cyberspace as
something new and alien creates in people a fear that it is indeed unknown
and unknowable, and people distrust the unknown. The result is concern
about what will govern this unknown and uncharted territory. Some have
argued that the Internet as a unique jurisdiction should be subject to its own
body of rules,7 while others have attempted to resolve issues on the Internet
by analogizing it to other areas of law.8 The real challenge is to examine the
Kaufmann Winn, The Emerging Law of Electronic Commerce, 52 Bus. LAW. 1469, 1469
(1997); Judith Y. Gliniecki & Ceda G. Ogada, The Legal Acceptance of Electronic
Documents, Writings, Signatures, and Notices in International TransportationConventions:
A Challenge in the Age of Global Electronic Commerce, 13 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 117
(1992); Daniel J. Greenwood & Ray A. Campbell, Electronic Commerce Legislation: From
Written on Paperand Signed in Ink to ElectronicRecords and Online Authentication, 53 Bus.
LAW. 307, 307-09 (1997) (comparing provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law with
domestic legislation). For an overview of the relationship between the domestic efforts and
the international efforts, see supra note 4. There are, of course, other efforts both within
UNCITRAL and other international organizations to consider other aspects of electronic
commerce.
7. See, e.g., David G. Post & David R. Johnson, Chaos Prevailingon Every Continent:
Towards a New Theory of DecentralizedDecision-Makingin Complex Systems, 73 Cm. KENT
L. REV. 4 (forthcoming 1999). In other contexts, the tendency to see the Internet as a separate
place necessitating different legal rules has been criticized. Andrew L. Shapiro, The
Disappearanceof Cyberspace and the Rise of Code, 8 SETON HALL CONsT. L.J. 703, 703
(1998) (concluding that the Internet is simply an alternative communications technology, and
that there is no more a need for the 'law of cyberspace' than there ever was for the "law of the
alphabet.").
8. One scholar surveyed the evolution of "Internet law," tracing it through two stages.
In the first stage, the Internet was analogized to other areas where the legal doctrine was well
established. In the second stage, a more advanced analysis focused on the nature and quality
of the activity taking place. See Michael A. Geist, The Reality of Bytes: Regulating Economic
Activity in the Age of the Internet, 73 WASH. L. REv. 521 (1998). Professor Geist's analysis
was limited to developments in the area of jurisdiction and did not encompass the area of
security and electronic commerce. Similarly, others trying to find trends in the law applicable
to the Internet have focused on First Amendment issues. See, e.g., Clay Calvert, Regulating
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need for rules in context and determine whether the issue under
consideration is sufficiently different in an Internet or online context to
justify a different set of rules than would otherwise exist. 9
The second need is security. In large part, the newness of the
technology, unfamiliarity with the operation of the Internet, and the potential
for fraud and error have given rise to concerns about the "trustworthiness" of
the system. Indeed, "security" is one of the key words that is often bandied
about in the context of electronic commerce; that is, the need for security
"security" are4
and trustworthiness in online transactions.10 12Concerns about
13
heard in all venues: legal," technological, business, and theoretical.

Cyberspace: Metaphor, Rhetoric, Reality and the Framing of Legal Options, 20 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 541, 554 (1998). Each area is distinguishable, however, from the

concerns of the present Article. For example, in the area of jurisdiction, the primary forum for
the development of "Internet law" has been the courts, not the legislature. By contrast, to
date, the primary forum for the development of Internet law in the commercial context has
been the private sector, and there have been few judicial decisions. Only recently have the
legislatures become involved.
9. See, e.g., Allan R. Stein, The UnexceptionalProblem of Jurisdictionin Cyberspace,

32 INT'L LAW 1167, 1167 (1998) (arguing that "there is nothing about legal relations over
computer networks that in any way challenges our conventional notions about how sovereign
authority is allocated in the world"); Amelia H. Boss, The Jurisdictionof Commercial Law:
Party Autonomy in Choosing Applicable Law and Forum Under ProposedRevisions to the
Uniform Commercial Code, 32 INT'L LAw 1067, 1068 (1998) (nothing about electronic

commerce requires different rules on enforceability of choice of law and forum clauses). In
Canada, a study for the federal government reached the same conclusion. Industry Canada
(1998), The Internet is not a No-Law Land, available at <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/>. See also
John D. Gregory, Solving Legal Issues in Electronic Commerce, CAN. Bus. L.J. (forthcoming
1999) (some legal issues in electronic commerce can be and are being resolved by application
of existing rules, once people become familiar with the new medium).
10. A sampling of the legal literature in the area of electronic commerce demonstrates
the currency of the theme of "security." See Public Key Infrastructure Symposium, 38
JURlMmucs J. 241 (1998).
11. Frequently, the legal arguments concerning security focus on restrictions on
cryptography. See STEWART A. BAKER & PAUL R. HURST, THE LIMITS OF TRUST:
CRYPTOGRAPHY, GOVERNMENTS, AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (The Hague, London & Boston,
1998).
12. Recently, there has been an extensive amount of writing on concepts of trust from a
technological perspective. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON INFO. SYS. TRUSTWORTHINESS, TRUST IN
CYBERSPACE (Fred B. Schneider ed. 1999), availableat <http://www.nap.edu/readingroom/>.
13. See Dan Greer, Risk Management Is Where the Money Is, THE RISKS DIG., Col. 20,
Issue 6 (Nov. 12, 1998) <http://catless.ncl.ac.ukrisks/20.06/htm>: "The focus of 'security'
research today is the study of 'trust management'-how trust is defined, created, annotated,
propagated, circumscribed, stored, exchanged, accounted for, recalled and adjudicated in our
electronic world." Id.
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The need to provide "security" or "secure systems" for electronic commerce
is being expressed not
just at the technical and implementation levels but in
15
legislatures as well.
Combined with this is the reality that many legislators also want to be
seen as at the cutting edge of technology and have introduced legislation at
both the state and the federal levels. 16 State legislators, in particular, want to
be the first to enact "electronic commerce" statutes, thereby attracting
businesses into their region and appearing to be global leaders to their
constituents. There might be, however, a problematic result: the passage of
"technology" legislation that is premature and potentially counterproductive.
II. THE NEED FOR SECURITY
Concerns about security, whether real or perceived,18 need to be put
into perspective. Security cannot be "legislated." It is a combination of
factors: the technology utilized, 19 its business implementation and state of
development, and the legal structure. Doing business "securely" on the
information highway is not a simple matter of developing the right
technologies to "lock up" information sent electronically to protect it against
14. Ed Gerck, Towards Real-World Models of Trust: Reliance on Received Information
<http://www.mcg.org.br/trustdef.htm> (presenting an abstract definition of trust derived from
different application areas, including communication systems, digital certificates, cryptography, law, linguistics, social sciences, etc.).
15. The United Kingdom has framed the issue as "building confidence in electronic
commerce."
See Building Confidence in Electronic Commerce (Mar. 5, 1999)
<http://www.dti.gov.uk/cii/elecelec_com.html>.
16. See, e.g., Philip S. Corwin, ElectronicAuthentication: The Emerging FederalRole,
38 JURIMETRICs J. 261 (1998) (discussing federal bills during the 105th Congress).
17. Australian Electronic Commerce Expert Group, Electronic Commerce: Building the
Legal Framework, Executive Summary <http://www.law.gov.au/aghomeladvisory/ecegl
welcome.html> ('There is the risk, particularly given the lack of any internationally uniform
legislative approach, that an inappropriate legislative regime may be adopted without regard to
market-oriented solutions.").
18. There is a view, generally accepted by persons familiar with technology, that in
certain areas technology has the capability of offering more security in commercial
transactions than paper-based systems. See WARWICK FORD & MICHAEL S. BAUM, SECURE
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: BUILDING THE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR DIGITAL SIGNATURES AND

ENCRYPTION (Upper Saddle River, NJ 1997); MICHAEL S. BAUM & HENRY H. PERRIrrT, JR.,
ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING, PUBLISHING, AND EDI LAW (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1991).
19. See Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia Krauthaus, Electronic Commerce: New
Paradigmsin Information Law, 31 IDAHO L. REv. 937, 945 (1995) ("the creation of systembased assurances of authenticity constitutes a condition precedent for continued expansion in
the modem use of the systems in important marketplaces").
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theft or alteration, nor is it a simple matter of developing authentication
techniques that allow us to determine with extreme accuracy the actual
originator or creator of a given message. "Secure" electronic commerce
cannot be achieved merely by legislating those circumstances when requisite
"security" is present. Rather, the "security" which business people seek
when they begin doing business electronically requires the creation of an
entire infrastructure-legal, social, economic, and political-one that is
based on practice which recognizes, validates, and supports electronic
commerce.
By comparison, many of us feel secure in our homes. This security
does not necessarily flow from the existence of technological devices to keep
out unwarranted intrusions: fences, burglar alarms, bolts, locks, or caller
identification on the telephone. To a great degree, the availability of those
devices does contribute to our sense of security, but the relationship is not
necessarily a direct correlation. Indeed, the more such technological security
devices there are in a home, the less likely it is that the inhabitant feels
"secure." While some locks or keys may be necessary, the strongest feelings
of security flow from the knowledge that locks and bolts are not needed, that
one can leave the house unlocked with the expectation that upon return,
things will be as they were upon departure.
Security is more than the technological exclusion of others from our
premises and more than mere legislation. Security flows in large part from
the ability to predict, with a fair degree of certainty, what lies ahead in our
daily lives, the ability to control it, and the ability to identify, again with a
fair degree of certainty, the risks that we may face so that we can take
protective measures. It also comes from the knowledge that there is a social,
political, economic, and legal system that protects us and recognizes our
rights. It is the overall structure, not any particular technology or law, that
creates that security. In our society, that overall structure includes the right
to use and control property, the ability to acquire and hold that property, the
knowledge that ownership of the property is free and clear of the claims of
others, the ability to exclude others from one's property, the ability to move
freely about the property and come and go as desired, the ability to allow
others access to one's property as desired, the ability to sell or otherwise
dispose of one's property, and the right to enforce that sale or transfer.
Security flows from the knowledge that the economic, social, and legal
systems recognize these20rights, and that redress is available from those who
violate or infringe them.
20. Security in the home also flows from the knowledge that there is an economic,
social, political, and legal structure out there that protects our home that sends firemen and
police as needed, arrests trespassers or thieves and brings them to justice through the court
system, and provides us with the services needed to use and enjoy our property.
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Similarly, for businesses involved in electronic commerce, "doing
business securely" means an entire complex of things. It encompasses the
ability to enter into a commercial transaction that proposes an exchange on
terms beneficial to each party, whether a sales, services, or commodities
agreement, with the reasonable expectation that it will be performed.
Contracts are performed because our economic, social, and legal structures
support these types of transactions and provide incentives for performance as
well as disincentives for breach. These economic, social, and legal
consequences of breach are the main reasons contracts are performed. Thus,
security in transactions means the knowledge that transactions will be
performed as expected and the stability and certainty that come with that
knowledge. Risk management, the ability to assess the possibilities and risks
of non-performance and to take the steps necessary and approvriate to
encourage performance or guard against breach, is a key ingredient.
In the electronic environment, what is arguably lacking at the moment is
a discernable legal and social structure that allows the parties to adequately
assess the risks of electronic commerce and to respond by making intelligent
choices concerning their own rights and liabilities, including allocation of
risks in transactions with others. For example, without an appropriate legal
structure that recognizes and validates electronic commerce, the presence of
all the encryption or authentication devices in the world will not give
businesses the security they need to conduct business in the electronic
environment. The legal structure must include laws recognizing the ability
to contract electronically, enforcing deals entered into electronically, and
setting forth the rules applicable to the transaction while recognizing the
power of the parties, within reason, to set the terms as between themselves
and choose the applicable law. This type of security-"legal security"flows from a legal framework, one that may, to a large extent, already exist,
but to the extent the application of that framework in the online environment
is less than clear, the resulting sense of security may be impaired. It must be
recognized, however, that "legal security" is only part of the overall
"security" picture.

21. A companion to the concept of "security" is that of "trust": the argument is that
systems, both legal and technological, need to be created which people may trust. Again, trust
has many meanings. To some, "trust" in electronic transactions may mean "I can count on this
transaction being enforced." Alternatively, the trust issue may be expressed as "I can count on
that this transaction will be carried out." A third possible phrasing: "I can trust the parties to
and persons involved in the transaction." And last: "I can trust that the systems themselves
are 'trustworthy."' Thus, you may have trust in the legal structure supporting the transaction,
trust in the parties to the transactions, trust in the performance of the transactions themselves,
without regard to legal enforcement, and trust in the systems. There are, additionally, a variety
of sources for "trust:" knowledge, experience, familiarity, and authority.
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The desire for "security" has manifested itself in online commerce in
somewhat traditional ways. Early on, in the absence of legislative and
judicial recognition and validation of electronic commerce and the
corresponding lack of industry-wide standards, customs, or standards to
guide conduct, attempts were made to set the rules for electronic commerce
through "trading partner agreements" between the parties doing business
electronically.Y Numerous regional and national model trading partner
agreements, or" interchange agreements, were developed to provide

commerce with a contractual framework for facilitating the adoption and use
of electronic commercial practices, thereby providing the parties with some
degree of certainty as to the terms applicable to their transactions. Although
there are differences between the various proposed interchange agreements,
a key ingredient of virtually all of them was the parties' articulation of the
technological security measures to be employed in transacting business
electronically, and delineation of the circumstances under which each party
would be bound by messages purportedly originated by that party.23
In situations where the parties were not in prior contact or direct
contact, or where the transactions were such that prior negotiation of such
agreements was impossible or impractical, alternative contractual models
were adopted. One tactic is the articulation by one of the parties to the
contract of the applicable terms, e.g., by posting of the terms on the relevant

22. "The idea of a model interchange agreement was first raised at the international
level by the Nordic Legal Community in the early 1980s." Amelia H. Boss, ElectronicData
InterchangeAgreements: PrivateContractingToward a Global Environment, 13 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 31, 38 (1992). In turn, the idea spread, and during the 1980s and early 1990s, there
was a proliferation of "model interchange agreements" produced by EDI user groups
representing specific industries by electronic data interchange associations, attorney groups,
government agencies, and international organizations, Id. See also Amelia H. Boss & Jeffrey
B. Ritter, ELEcTRoNIc DATA INTERCHANGE AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE AND SOURCEBOOK (1993).
In the United States, such a model interchange agreement was proposed by a group within the
American Bar Association. See The Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, The
Commercial Use of Electronic Data Interchange-A Report and Model Trading Partner
Agreement, 45 Bus. LAW. 1645 (1990).
23. Many of the following issues are addressed in those agreements: selection of EDI
messages, message standards, and methods of communication; responsibilities for ensuring
that the equipment, software, and services are operated and maintained effectively; procedures
for making any systems changes which impair the ability of trading partners to communicate;
security procedures and services; the points at which electronic messages have legal effect; the
roles and contracts with any third party service providers; procedures for dealing with
technical errors; the needs, if any, of confidentiality; liabilities in the event of any delay or
failure to meet agreed EDI communications requirements; the laws governing the interchange
of EDI messages and the arrangements of the parties; and methods for resolving any potential
disputes. See Boss, supra note 22; Boss and Ritter, supra note 22.
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website 24 or by postings stating that any transactions were to be governed by
a given set of practices.25 A variation of this type of contract was the
development of operating rules within defined systems that purport to bind
o
all
participants
in development
the system.26of industry
Establishment
"codes
of
conduct
and the
standardsof voluntary
are two other
options

24. The desires of commercial parties to govern online transactions by posting, or
having available on a website, the terms and conditions that purport to cover the transactions
entered into on the website have led to the use of what have been called "click-wrap" or
"shrink-wrap" licenses. Questions as to the enforceability of such terms and conditions have
in turn given rise to litigation. Step-Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 103 (3d Cir.
1991); ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996); Vault Corp. v. Quaid
Software Let., 847 F.2d 255, 258 (5th Cir. 1988). They have also stimulated efforts to address
such terms on the state level, the national level, and the international level, amidst
considerable controversy. For an overview of the range of reactions to these issues, see
Symposium, Intellectual Property and Contract Law in the Information Age: The Impact of
Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Future of Transactionsin Information and
ElectronicCommerce, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 809 (1998); Symposium, IntellectualProperty
and Contract Law for the Information Age: The Impact of Article 2B of the Uniform
Commercial Code on the Future of Information and Commerce, 87 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1999).
See also Mark A. Lemley, IntellectualProperty and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REv.
1239 (1995); Apik Minassian, The Death of Copyright: Enforceability of Shrinkwrap
Licensing Agreements, 45 UCLA L. REv. 569 (1997); Jennett M. Hill, Note, The State of
Copyright Protection for Electronic Databases Beyond ProCD v. Zeidenberg: Are
Shrinkwrap Licenses A Viable Alternative for Database Protection?, 31 IND. L. REv. 143
(1998); Joseph C. Wang, Note, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg and Article 2B: Finally, the
Validation of Shrink-Wrap Licenses, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 439 (1997);
Christopher L. Pitet, Note and Comment, The Problem With "Money Now, Terms Later":
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg and the Enforceability of "Shrinkwrap" Software Licenses, 31
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 325 (1997); Thomas Finkelstein & Douglas C. Wyatt, Note, Shrinkwrap
Licenses: Consequences of Breaking the Seal, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 839 (1997).
25. In the case of providers of certain services, this was accomplished through the
development of statements of practice, such as the certification practice statements used by
certification authorities in the context of digital signatures. See, e.g., the certification practice
statements published on the Internet by GTEI-CyberTrust, <http://www.bbnplanet.com/
products/security/cytrust/cps.htm>; True Trust Limited <http://fw4.iti.salford.ac.uk/truetrust/
cps/>; and Verisign http://www.verisign.com/ repository/CPS/>.
26. An example is the system rules for international inter-bank transfers, established by
the Society for Worldwide Interbank Funds Transfers ("SWIFT").
27. In 1987, the International Chamber of Commerce took the first step by developing
and producing the Uniform Rules of Conduct for Interchange of Trade Data by
Teletransmission (ICC Publication no. 452). The UNCID rules, the first product in this area,
were aimed at facilitating the interchange of trade data effected by teletransmission through
the establishment of agreed rules of conduct between parties engaged in such transactions. The
UNCID rules were not self-executing but voluntary, requiring the agreement of the parties to
incorporate its terms in their own relationship. See The Working Party on Facilitation of
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that have been explored. One current project proposes to establish a
common set of legal "Eterms" which can be incorporated by parties into
their electronic messages, thereby providing the private legal structure to
In addition, there has been a move to provide
guide the transaction.
certainty through the use of choice of law and forum clauses and a
corresponding desire to strengthen the enforceability of such clauses in
electronic commerce"
In 1997, the White House issued its report, A Framework for Global
Electronic Commerce,3 1 which set forth the administration's policies with
regard to the law of the Internet. The administration firmly emphasized that
in the area of electronic commerce, the private sector should lead, and
government regulation should be discouraged. Governments were urged to
avoid undue restrictions on electronic commerce and at the same time
encouraged to allow new business models and products to evolve. Ifand
when government intervention is deemed necessary to facilitate electronic
commerce, the administration cautioned that the government's "aim should
minimalist, consistent, and simple
be to support and enforce a predictable,
32
legal environment for commerce."
The White House recognized that despite the preferability of private
sector leadership, there might be a need to draft rules governing global
In that regard, it urged the elimination of
electronic commerce.
administrative and regulatory barriers to commerce and the recognition of
certain fundamental principles. The primary principle is, of course, freedom
of contract, the ability of "fully informed buyers and sellers" to set their own
rules. Equally important, the administration urged that any legislation or
rules be "technology neutral," i.e., the rules should neither require nor
International Trade Procedures, UN/ECE Trade FacilitationRecommendation No. 26 (March
1995) <http://www.unece.orgttradetrec/rec26en.htm>.

28. E.g., in the context of digital signatures, concerns about certification services and
the fear that the public would be misled has led to exploration of the establishment of private
systems for accreditation of certification authorities according to preestablished industry
standards. Charles R. Merrill, The Accreditation Guidelines-A ProgressReport on a Work in
Progressof the ABA Information Security Committee, 38 JURIMETRCS J. 345, 347-48 (1998)
(detailing accreditation guidelines' project and need for developing standards of
trustworthiness).
29. See Andreas Mitrakas & Janjaap Bos, The ICC ETERMS Repository to Support
PublicKey Infrastructure,38 JUIMETRIcs J. 473 (1998).
30. See Boss, supra note 9.
31. See William J. Clinton & Albert Gore, Jr., A Frameworkfor Global Electronic
Commerce <http://www.iitf.nist.gov/eleccommlecomm.htm>.
32. Id. Two other principles were also iterated: that governments should recognize the
unique qualities of the Internet and that electronic commerce should be facilitated on a global
basis.
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assume a particular technology and be flexible enough to permit the
development of new technologies in the future.3
In recognizing the need for legislation, and at the same time urging a
minimalist approach, the White House report reflected discussions in
business, academic, and political circles over the past several years. These
discussions, however, revealed two distinct approaches, with distinct policy
recommendations and legislative proposals flowing from them. These need
to be examined in more detail.
I. THE DEBATE: A CONFLUENCE OF TWO STREAMS

The advent of electronic communications technologies and electronic
commerce has, over the years, given rise to two distinct movements with
regard to law reform, each with its own set of adherents.
Initially, concerns about electronic commerce focused on existing legal
structures and principles. The main concern was the application of existing
law to transactions entered into electronically. Attempts were made to
identify existing barriers to electronic commerce and to determine the extent
to which modification of these and other general transactional rules were
required in an electronic environment. On the international level, the notion
that governments should review legal requirements governing trade and
commerce to determine their suitability for electronic commerce surfaced
over fifteen years ago.34 Domestically, the need to review existing laws has
been recognized on both the federal and state levels. Those approaching
these issues tended to view the question as follows: what changes are
33. A concept related to that of "technology neutrality" is that of "implementation
neutrality," the recognition that any rules or laws neither assume nor require the
implementation of certain technology in preset ways. A third concept is neutrality, seeking an
equivalence between transactions regardless of the medium used for communication. The
basic goal of all these efforts is that the law should not discriminate between information on
paper and information in electronic form.
34. The removal of legal barriers to electronic commerce became an international issue
as early as 1985, when the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL") called upon all governments to "review legal requirements of a handwritten
signature or other paper-based methods of authentication on trade related documents with a
view to permitting, where appropriate, the use of electronic means of authentication." U.N.
GAOR, 40 th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 72, U.N. Doc. (A/40/17).
35. See, e.g., Matter of National Institute of Standards and Technology-Use of
Electronic Data Interchange Technology to Create Valid Obligations, Dec. of the Comp. Gen.
Of the U.S., File B-245714 (Dec. 13, 1991) <http://www.softwareindustry.org/issues/docsorg/cg-opinion.pdf> ("Contracts formed using Electronic Data Interchange Technologies may
constitute valid obligations of the government for purposes of 31 U.S.C. § 1501, so long as
the technology used provides the same degree of assurance and certainty as traditional 'paper
and ink' methods of contract formation.").
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necessary, in the area of commercial law, evidence, etc., to accommodate
electronic commerce. Attempts to accommodate electronic commerce
focused on the adaptation of the traditional transactional rules. The goal was
to assure that electronic commerce was not discriminated against solely
because of the medium in which it occurred.
For example, the law has traditionally required "writings" and
"signatures" as a prerequisite for the enforcement of many transactions, 3
and the application of those requirements to electronic commerce has been
problematic. The legislative response, at least within the context of
commercial law, 37 was twofold: either to eschew the terms "writing" and
"signature" in new legislation in favor of terms such as "record" and
"authentication, ' '38 or to provide affirmatively that existing writing and
signature requirements could be met by electronic messages. 39 Most of these
changes occurred within the context of more generalized substantive
revisions of commercial law aimed at updating and modernizing commercial
law to accommodate electronic commerce.
By contrast, a second movement started not with a focus on existing
law, but rather with a focus on technology and its implementation. Concerns
about security motivated members of the digital community to begin
36. This, of course, is the notion behind our statute of frauds, which dates back to the
adoption by the British Parliament of the first such statute in 1677. Since then, the writing
requirement of the statute of frauds has been adopted with some modification in nearly all of
the United States. Subject to several exceptions, the statute provides that no suit or action
may be instituted under certain categories of contracts unless that contract is written and
signed by the party to be charged. See generally James J. White & Robert S. Summers,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-1 to 2-12 (3d ed. 1988). However, the British Parliament
repealed its statute of frauds in 1954. Id. See also R. J.Robertson, Electronic Commerce on
the Internet and the Statute of Frauds,49 S.C. L. REv. 787 (1998).
37. The legislative response was actually preceded by a contractual response by the
parties to the transaction. See supranotes 21-29 and accompanying text.
38. The term "record" was developed over time expressly to deal with electronic
records and had been developed and refined by the American Bar Association and the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws as a generic term for use
throughout proposed legislation. It has since become standard language in products of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See Patricia B. Fry, X Marks
the Spot: New Technologies Compel New Concepts for Commercial Law, 26 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 607 (1993) (detailing history of the concept of "record"). See also U.C.C. §§ 5-102(14),
5-104, & 8-113 (using the term "record"); §§ 5-104, 8-113 (using the term "authenticate").
39. See, e.g., Uniform Electronic Transactions Act § 106(c) (Proposed Draft Jan. 29,
1999) ("If a rule of law requires a record to be in writing ...an electronic record satisfies the
rule of law."); id. § 106(d) (Proposed Draft Jan. 29, 1999) ("[i]f a rule of law requires a
signature.. ., the rule of law is satisfied with respect to an electronic record if the electronic
record included an electronic signature."). Compare UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic
Commerce, Articles 6 (writing), and 7 (signature).
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exploration of technological means of providing security to participants in
electronic commerce. Three issues were identified as "security" risks: 1)
authenticity-the problem of identifying the source or sender of a message
and authenticating that it did indeed come from that sender; 2) integrity-the
problem of proving that the message is complete and has not been altered
since it was sent; and 3) non-repudiation-the risk that the sender may
repudiate it after receipt.4
One technology, digital signatures, quickly became the "favorite"
among many technology afficionados, who claimed it offered a technologybased cure for many of the security risks encountered in online commerce.
In many regards, the description of the technology as "digital signatures" is a
misnomer. In essence, what is being advanced is a method of encryptionor more appropriately, dual key encryption using two mathematically related
numbers, or keys. 4 ' Each key pair consists of two keys: a person's private
key, which is kept private, and the public key which can be made publicly
available. When the private key is applied to a message, the message is
transformed or encrypted, and a string of numbers is created, the "digital
signature" for that message, which is unique to both the key used to encrypt
and to the message itself. The recipient of that message can, by using the
public key corresponding to the key used by the sender, determine whether
the message was sent by the person holding that corresponding private ke
and determine whether the message had been altered since it was made.4
40. Although "non-repudiation" is often referred to as a desirable attribute of security
procedures, a persuasive argument has been made that whether a person may repudiate a
message is actually a legal construct related to the question of the message's authenticity. John
D. Gregory, Solving Legal Issues in Electronic Commerce, CAN. Bus. L.J. (forthcoming
1999).
41. Although the two numbers are mathematically related, in theory it is
computationally infeasible to ascertain what is known as the "private key" of the sender using
the "public key" applied by the recipient to unlock the message. If the key utilized is
sufficiently long, it would apparently take "extremely powerful computers [many] years and
millions of dollars, to crack a single public/private key pair." Greenwood & Campbell, supra
note 6, at n.14.
42. Thus, "digital signatures" have been defined as:
[A] transformation of a message using an asymmetric cryptosystem such that
a person having the intitial message and the signer's public key can accurately
determine whether:
(a) the transformation was created using the private key that
corresponds to the signer's public key; and
(b) the message has been altered since the transformation was made.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-103(10) (1998). For a good tutorial on digital signatures, see
<http:llwww.abanet.orglscitechlecliscdsg-tutorial.html>.
See also Information Security
Committee, Section of Science and Technology, American Bar Association, Public Key
InfrastructureSymposium-Tutorial, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 243 (1998).
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One major obstacle to the easy use of this technology is assuring the
potential recipient of a message, and user of one-half of the key pair, of the
identity of the holder of the other key. In situations where the two parties
know one another and can directly exchange keys, there is no problem. In
systems such as on the Internet where the parties do not necessarily know
each other, identity of the holder of a private key is an issue. To resolve this
problem, industry has proposed an implementation of dual key encryption
which involves the creation of a "public key infrastructure," or PKI, under
which a third party, known as a certification authority, or CA, has the task of
verifying the identity of the holder of a key and that the key being used by
the recipient is the reciprocal of the key used by the sender.43
Supporters of the technology began to develop various models-public
key infrastructures-for the use of digital signatures in commerce. 44 In large
part, the development of these models involved decisions as to the
appropriate business structures to use for electronic commerce. Moreover,
the creation of new public key infrastructures raised interesting issues about
the relationship between the various parties in the structure. In attempts to
resolve these relationship issues and to encourage use of the technology,
supporters began to advance the notion that a new legal structure was
necessary to promote and facilitate the development of public key
infrastructures. As a result, the proponents, concerned primarily with
advancing the technology and its business implementations, are now
advancing a legal construct to support and promote their specific
implementation models. 45
43. This explanation is obviously very simplified. Assume that a message purports to
come from Bill Gates and is "digitally signed." The recipient will first want to know that the
key it applies to the message is indeed the reciprocal to one held by Bill Gates. Second, it will
want to know that the person who obtained the key using the name '"ill Gates" was indeed
Bill Gates. Third, the recipient will want to know that the person who actually used the key
was either Bill Gates or someone acting with authority for Bill Gates.
44. Interestingly, the implementation models that have been advanced have changed
over time. Initially, for example, it was contemplated that certification authorities would
provide "certificates" directly to the holders of private keys and that the key holders would
then use these certificates in communications with others. As the various models have
developed over time, however, it appears to be more common for the certification authority to
supply the certificate not to the key holder but to the relying party, the recipient of the
message who wants to verify the identity of the key holder.
45. As one proponent of such legislation has stated:
[I]t is our desire to make current technology more available and more
useful for real-world applications. This can be done by objectively reviewing
what the various available technologies can do, grouping them according to
their attributes of security, reliability, scalability, and so on, and creating
legislative constructs (including for self-regulation) appropriate to each
technology.
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In 1995, Utah, the home to high technology companies with an interest
in the topic, followed by Minnesota6 and Washington, 47 became the first to
enact a digital signature statute setting forth specific rules governing digital
signatures and public key infrastructures.4a The main characteristic of this
legislation is its regulatory nature, providing for a licensing scheme for
certification authorities. 49 Licensed certificate authorities under the statutes
are given significant limitations on their liability to other parties within the
public key infrastructure.50 Indeed, it can be argued that the primary purpose
behind the legislation is this limitation of liability, and that the licensing
regime serves that limitation. The liability scheme was seen as necessary to
assure commercial developers "that the risks of potential liability to users of
the system could be kept within tolerable limits." 51 Although the statutes
also attempted to address the rights and responsibilities of other participants
in the public key infrastructure, only a small portion of the digital signature
statutes pertains to the legal effect to be given to the use of the digital
signature. These statutes frequently went further than saying that a person
may use a digital signature and effectively meet any writing or signature
requirements. Consistent with the philosophy of attempting to provide a
comprehensive scheme to apportion all liability of the parties, these laws
provided that where a digital signature was accompanied by a verifiable
certificate issued from a certification authority licensed under the statute, it
was entitled to the presumption that it was affixed by the holder of the

Michael S. Baum, Technology Neutrality and Secure Electronic Commerce: Rule Making in
the Age of "Equivalence" at 4, n.5 (1998) <http:llwww.verisign.comlrepository/
pubs/techneutral/> (emphasis added). Reviewing and grouping may perform wonderful
services to businesses attempting to implement electronic commerce, allowing parties to
choose the attributes of security important to them. Whether legislation and new legal
constructs are needed to facilitate those choices is a different issue.
46. See UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 46, Ch. 3 (1996).
47. Minnesota Electronic Authentications Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325 (West 1998)
<http:llwww.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/stats/325K/>.
48. Washington Electronic Authentications Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.34 (West
1998) <http://www.wa.gov/secldsrcq.htm>.
49. For example, the Utah statute confers authority on a state agency to license
certificate authorities that operate within their jurisdiction. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-201204 (1998).
50. See, e.g., id. § 46-3-309 (limiting liability of certification authority to amount it
includes in its certificate and specifically excluding consequential damages).
51. Jane Kaufman Winn, Open Systems, Free Markets, and Regulation of Internet
Commerce, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1177, 1241 (1998). 'This limit on the potential liability of the
[Certificate Authority] to subscribers and relying parties, above and beyond any liability that it
has expressly undertaken and set forth in its certification practice statement, is a pivotal risk
allocation rule." Id. at 1242.
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private key and was therefore attributable to it.5 2 Although these signing and
attribution provisions were only a part of a larger digital signature statutory
scheme, they overlapped with the efforts begun earlier to define signing and
attribution in the commercial context.
In effect, these two separate movements, one with its origins in the law,
the other with its origins in the technology, represent two philosophies. The
first, which began with a concentration on commercial law issues, has
focused on keeping commercial laws generic and supportive. The goals
have been to remove barriers to electronic commerce, treat electronic
communications on a par with paper communications, and not to favor one
technology over another (technology neutrality) nor one business model over
another (implementation neutrality). As between different technologies or
implementation schemes, the choice was to be that of the parties. This
approach exhibits a degree of confidence in the marketplace to make suitable
options available to parties, allowing them to make intelligent choices. The
second movement has the philosophy-and the express goal-of supporting
and promoting specific technologies, or, more correctly, one specific
technology and one implementation model. The theory is that the
technology and implementation offer such benefits to the users of the
Internet that legislation should recognize those benefits and enshrine them in
the law. Despite their different orientations, both movements ended up
dealing with the same issue: the satisfaction of legal requirements of
writings and signatures through technological means in an electronic
environment.
At the outset, the two movements were relatively separate; those
revising the commercial laws and those building PKI infrastructures
represented two different constituencies: law revisionists and technology
supporters. To a large extent, however, the "digital signature" movement
was the more visible of the two. Commercial law does not tend to have
inherent appeal to either the public or to legislators. On the other hand, mere
mention of certain buzzwords, such as "Internet," "security," or
"technology," immediately piques the interest of both the public and the
legislature. Among the public, the digital signature movement quickly
gained two distinct bodies of followers. The first consisted of those who
saw digital signatures as the answer for Internet security.53 Because of their
belief in the security aspects of digital signatures, the desire was to build a
structure, a business structure as well as a legal structure, to support the
technology. The second body of followers were those business people
attracted to the digital signature movement not because of any interest in the
52. UTAHCODE ANN. § 46-3-406 (1998).
53. Some of these participants were in fact representing businesses that were marketing
digital signature technology; others were simply focused on the merits of the technology.
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technology itself but because of concerns about the ability of the law in its
current state to recognize and validate online business transactions. Their
desire to gain legal recognition of electronic communications contributed to
their support for digital signature legislation. That support, driven out of a
desire to establish the validity of electronic commerce, was given in the
absence of a recognition that other efforts would establish that validity
without the need for a complicated, legal, and regulatory structure for digital
signatures.
Ultimately, the law revision and technology "movements" joined issue
on the question of the legal effects to be given to certain uses of the
technology to "sign" or otherwise authenticate messages. In one regard, the
dispute is between the "removal" of barriers to electronic commerce through
the development of generic rules and the "support and promotion" of
electronic commerce through the creation of rules geared to promoting its
use. In another regard, the dispute is whether specific types of technology
implementations should be given special treatment under the law.
IV. SURVEYING THE BATrLE FRONT

The war between the law revision and technology movements is being
waged on many simultaneous fronts: within the individual states, at the
federal level in Congress, at the uniform law level within the United States,
at the national level abroad, and on the international level as well. On the
individual state level, state legislatures have acted in a variety of ways to
accommodate electronic commerce, but four patterns of statutes have
emerged over time, reflecting the influence of the two movements. Initially,
Utah was the first state to adopt a full-fledged digital signature statute
supporting a public key infrastructure,54 legislation which was based on
efforts of the American Bar Association's Information Security Committee,
which published a set of Digital Signature Guidelines.55 The approach used
by Utah and the Digital Signature Guidelines, however, of setting forth a
highly structured, prescriptive, regulatory environment only for digital
signatures, has not been widely followed by the states. 56 California quickly
54. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-101 (1996). The 1996 legislation was a revision of
legislation which originally became effective in 1995.
55. ABA COMM. ON INFORMATION SECURrrY, DigitalSignature Guidelines(1996). It is
interesting to note that, while the Guidelines were developed within a committee of the
American Bar Association, that committee consisted of a substantial number of individuals
who were not lawyers but were drawn from various segments of the technology industry.
56. For an excellent survey, see Internet Law and Policy Forum, Survey of State
Electronic & Digital Legislative Signature Initiatives, submitted Sept. 12, 1997
<http://www.ilpf.orgdigsig/digrep.htm>, updated, Internet Law and Policy Forum, UPDATE:
Survey
of State Electronic & Digital Signature Legislative Initiatives
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followed on the heels of Utah by enacting legislation that did not follow the
Utah statute in its adhesion to public key cryptography. Rather, it drafted a
technology-neutral law.57 It provided that an electronic signature58 would
have the same legal effect as a manual signature if it has these attributes: it
is unique to the person using it, it is capable of verification, it is under the
sole control of the person using it, it is linked to the data in such a manner
that, if the data are changed, the electronic signature is invalidated, and it
conforms to regulations adopted by the Secretary of State. 59 Later
regulations permitted either digital signature using a certification authority
or signature dynamics. 6° The California approach has proven to be more
61
popular in the United States than the Utah focus on digital signatures alone.
While it is more generalized, a person using a certain security procedure
must demonstrate that either it fits within the regulations or within the
generalized criteria set forth in the statute before the digital signature is
given effect.
Florida followed a third approach when, in 1996, it enacted the
Electronic Signature Act. 62 Florida represents the enabling approach,
emphasizing the elimination of artificial barriers to electronic commerce.
Under the Act, the term "writing" is defined to include information created
or stored in any electronic medium that is also retrievable in perceivable
form.63 Any such writing containing an electronic signature, defined to
include
any letters, characters, or symbols, manifested by electronic or
<http://www.ilpf.org/digsig/UPDATE.HTM>. Another source of current information on state
and other legislation is the McBride Baker Coles site, <http://www.mbe. com/>.
57. California was influenced, in part, by international legislation, the Model Law on
Electronic Commerce, being drafted by the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law. See supra note 6.
58. California used the expression "digital signature" to cover more than just signatures
using public key cryptography. To avoid confusion in the text, the term "electronic signature"
is used to emphasize that the legislation applies to any signatures in electronic form, whether
or not they are technically dual key encryption "digital" signatures.
59. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16.5 (West 1995). The first four criteria were first
established in a decision of the Comptroller General of the United States in Matter of National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)-Use of Electronic Data Interchange
Technology to Create Valid Obligations, Comp. Gen. File VB-245714 (Dec. 13, 1991)
<http://www.softwareindustry.orgtissues/docs-orgtcg-opinion.pdf>.
60. Signature dynamics is associated with PenOp, a system of signing manually using
computer-recorded strokes. See PenOp, Welcome to PenOp, the World's Leading Electronic
Handwritten Signature<http://www.penop.com/>.
61. See ILPF Survey, supra note 57.
62. Electronic Signature Act of 1996, 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-224 (codified as amended
at FLA. STAT. § 282.72 (1996)).
63. This formulation tracks the definition of a "record" in uniform legislation proposed
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See supra note 39.
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similar means, with intent to authenticate a writing, may be used to sign a
writing and is given the same force and effect as a written signature. This
enabling approach has become increasingly popular among the states that
have considered the question. 64 It does not require an extensive set of
regulations, does not set forth specific technologies and implementations that
it sanctions, nor does it set forth "criteria" for judging whether electronic
signatures will be given legal effect.
A fourth approach developed in Illinois as a "middle ground" between
digital specific statutes and mere enabling statutes: the concept of a hybrid
statute that enabled the use of electronic signatures by validating their use,
but at the same time recognized a category of "secure electronic
signatures."
Anyone may use an electronic signature in electronic
commerce and be assured that legal writing and signature requirements are
no obstacle. However, if a signature qualifies as a secure electronic
signature by meeting criteria similar to that found in the California statute,
rebuttable evidentiary presumptions arise as to the authenticity and integrity
of the signature.
The lack of uniformity among the various state enactments has led to
activity on two fronts. Pressure is being placed on Congress to take action,
both from the fear that states will delay in responding to the needs of
electronic commerce and from the fear that their responses will be nonuniform in character. Thus, the push is on to: 1) develop standards for use
of electronic and digital signatures in transactions with the government; 2)
develop a federal standard for recognition of electronic and digital
signatures; and 3) preempt state law. Several bills have been introduced
over the past few years to deal with electronic commerce, although none
have yet been enacted. The scope and approach of the proposed legislation
has differed drastically. At one end of the spectrum is proposed legislation
merely giving effect to "electronic signatures" as a method of signing;66 this
type of legislation would best be characterized as enabling legislation. Other
proposed legislation, within the banking context, proposed to validate
"secure" electronic techni 9ues of authentication adopted pursuant to
agreement or system rules; to the extent this legislation would merely

64. ILPF Survey, supra note 57.
65. The Illinois statute was enacted in 1998. 205 ILL. CoMP. STAT. § 705/10 (West
1998).
66. See Government Paperwork Elimination Act of 1998, S. 2107, 105th Cong. (1998)
(sanctioning electronic signing of forms submitted to federal agencies); Paperwork
Elimination Act of 1999, H.R. 439, 106th Cong. (1999) (following Government Paperwork
Elimination Act); Millennium Digital Commerce Act, S. 761, 106th Cong. (1999).
67. The Digital Signature and Electronic Authentication Law of 1998, S. 1594, 105th
Cong. (1998) (validating electronic authentication under relevant "agreements" or "system
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reinforce the ability of the parties to govern their transactions by agreement,
it would be consistent with an enabling and validating approach. A bit
further down on the scale is proposed legislation providing that close-us
electronic signatures meeting certain criteria are acceptable as signatures.
To the extent that legislation begins to set additional hurdles for electronic
commerce, it begins to move from merely enabling and starts to introduce a
channeling function-that of telling businesses what technologies they
should adopt. One piece of proposed federal legislation, in the context of
federal tax filings, would create a presumption that the person on whose
behalf a return was filed did indeed subscribe to and submit the return.69 As
will be discussed below, presumptions have become a fertile battleground on
the uniform law level; this proposed federal legislation, however, deals
solely with communications, i.e., tax filings, with the government and
relieves the Internal Revenue Service of proving in each instance that a
particular taxpayer did indeed file the return under consideration. The
proposed bill that goes the furthest in establishing a more regulatory
approach would establish
a federal panel to develop a national digital
7
signature infrastructure. 0
The primary thrust of the federal push is the need for immediate
uniform national legislation. There are other efforts on a state-by-state basis
that should fill that need. The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws will be taking final action in July 1999 on two pieces of
proposed uniform legislation that will address the concerns of at least those
who want to validate and enforce electronic transactions by removing

rules" and authorizing their use by financial institutions pursuant to agreement or pursuant to
a "banking, financial, or transactional system using electronic authentication").
68. Electronic Financial Services Efficiency Act of 1997, H.R. 2937, 105th Cong.
(1997) (stating all forms of electronic authentication meeting certain standards "shall have
standing equal to paper-based, written signatures"). Those standards are: 1) the identification
method be unique to the person sending the communication; 2) the identification technology
be capable of verification; 3) the identification method be under the sole control of the person
using it; and 4) that the identification method be linked to the data in such a way that if the
data is altered, the authentication becomes invalid. Id. This follows the approach begun in
the California legislation--borrowing the standards from NIST, supra note 36, and
subsequently picked up in several states.
69. Internal Revenue Restructuring and Reform Bill of 1997, H.R. 2676, 105th Cong.
(1997) (sanctioning tax returns filed electronically and stating that any return filed
electronically shall be presumed to have been submitted and subscribed to by the person on
whose behalf it was filed).
70. Computer Security Enhancement Act of 1997, H.R. 1903, 105th Congress (1997)
(also authorizing National Institute of Standards and Technology to assist private sector in
developing voluntary standards and guidelines for a public key infrastructure).
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barriers to electronic commerce. 71 Driven in large part by concerns about
nonuniformity among the states, these efforts have benefitted greatly from
the "experimentation" that has already occurred on the state level. The need
for uniformity should be achieved,
without federal preemption,
if either of
• •
72
these measures gain sufficient enactment by the states.
On the international scale, a similar pattern is beginning to emerge,
although developments internationally are lagging somewhat behind those in
the United States. Following the lead of Utah, and inspired in large part by
the Digital Signature Guidelines, several countries, including Germany,
76
Italy, 74 Malaysia, 75 and Argentina, have enacted legislation relating to
electronic authentication and adopting to some degree the approach
pioneered by Utah. By contrast, Singapore has adopted an approach loosely
based on the Illinois hybrid approach, drawing a distinction between
electronic signatures on the one hand, which it enables, and secure electronic
records and signatures on the other, including digital signatures. 77 Similarly
taking a hybrid approach is the recently released EU Directive on Digital
Signatures
and several drafts considered by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law.79
71. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
72. Indeed, recent federal legislation would not preempt state laws in those states that
have enacted uniform state law such as the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act. See
Millennium Digital Conference Act, 1999 S. 761 (Mar. 26, 1999), section 6(c).
73. German Digital Signature Law (Aug. 1, 1997) <http://www.iid.de/rahmen
/iukdgbt.html>, availablein English at <http://www.kuner.com/data/sig/digsig4.htm>.
74. See Italian Law N. 59, Art. 15, c. 2 (enacted Mar. 15, 1997), available in Italian at
<http://www.interlex.comltesti/attielet.htm>, and regulations promulgated Nov. 10, 1997
(Presidential
Decree
No.
513),
available in
Italian at
<http://www.
notariato.it/forum/dpr_513.htm>.
75. See Malaysia Digital Signature Act, Law No. 59 of 15 Mar. 1997
<http://www.mycert.mimasmy/digital.html.>.
76. Legislation has also been passed in Italy. Argentina has also adopted digital
signature legislation by presidential decree. Presidential Decree No. 427/98 <http://www.sfp.
gov.ar/firma.html>, availablein English at <http://www.sfp.gov.ar/decree427.html>.
77. Singapore Electronic Transaction Act (adopted June 29, 1998), available at
<http://www.ech.ncb.gov.sg/>.
78. European Commission, Proposalfor a EuropeanParliamentand CouncilDirective
on a Common Framework for Electronic Signatures (May 13, 1998) <http://www.ispo.
cec.be/eif/policy/com98297.html>. The articulated goal of the directive was to "[ensure] the
proper functioning of the Internal Market in the field of electronic signatures by creating a
harmonized and appropriate legal framework for the use of electronic signatures within the
[European] Community and establishing a set of criteria which form the basis for legal
recognition of electronic signatures." Id.
79. See the Preparatory Documents for the UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic
Commerce <http://www.un.or.at/uncitral/>. For many years, UNCITRAL adhered to the
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Several other nations, however, have refused to legislate detailed
standards for the use of different authentication techniques or one particular
technique, urging instead a simple enabling approach. In March 1998, the
Australian Electronic Commerce Expert Group issued its report on the laws
of electronic commerce, in which it concluded:
It is our view that the enactment of legislation which creates a
detailed legislative regime for electronic signatures needs to be
considered with caution. There is the risk, particularly given the
lack of any internationally uniform legislative approach, that an
inappropriate legislative regime may be adopted without regard to
market-oriented solutions. Given the pace of technological
development and change in this area, it is more appropriate for the
market to determine issues other than legal effect, such as the levels
of security and reliability required for electronic signatures.
Accordingly, we have recommended that legislation should deal
simply with the legal effect of electronic signatures. While a
number of articles in the Model Law deal with electronic signature
issues that go beyond legal effect, it is our view that these issues
should be left to the existing law in Australia. Whether the existing
Australian law deals with these issues adequately or not, the same
situation should apply to both paper based commerce and
electronic commerce. At this stage we are not persuaded of the
need to give a legislative advantage to electronic commerce not
available to traditional means of communication. If a clear need to
deal with these issues appears
in the future the recommended
80
legislation can be amended.
Similarly, the New Zealand Law Commission, in its October 1998
report on Electronic Commerce, rejected the approach of technology specific
legislation as found in Utah and Germany and adopted as one of its guiding

notion that it was important to maintain technology in its rules, and therefore pursued the dual
approach. At its February 1999 meeting, however, the Working Group backed away from the
attempts to develop a "media neutral" set of rules and opted for the moment to pursue
development of public key infrastructure ("PI") or digital signature specific rules.
80. Australian Electronic Commerce Expert Group, Electronic Commerce: Building the
Legal Framework, Executive Summary <http:llwww.law.gov.aulaghomeladvisory/eceg
/summary.html>. Legislation has since been proposed which would follow the provisions of
the UNCITRAL Model Law and therefore have no special recognition given to digital
signatures nor any presumptions attaching beyond those provided for in the Model Law. See
AustralianDraft Electronic TransactionsBill <http://law.gov.aul ecommerce/>.
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principles "technological neutrality."'8' The Law Commission recommended
merely that legislation be82 passed to ensure that electronic signatures would
be acceptable under law.
V. ENABLING VERSUS PROMOTING: THE DEBATE IN THE
UNIFORM LAW PROCESS

The debate within the uniform law process, as it is currently
proceeding, highlights the controversy between those who view the
appropriate role of law revision as simply removing barriers to electronic
commerce-with the marketplace providing other necessary incentives and
support-and those who feel that security on the Internet is and should be
promoted by legislation that gives advantages to those who adopt the
appropriate technology. In August of 1999, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws will be presented with two pieces of
proposed uniform legislation: a new Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
("UETA")8" and an addition to the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2B,
that deals with computer information transactions.84 Despite the worthy goal
of uniformity and the original mandate to the drafting committees to be
consistent, these two products are not uniform in their treatment of security
procedures and their use. Indeed, their lack of uniformity exemplifies the
tension between those dedicated to removing barriers to electronic
commerce and those wishing to support and promote by creating confidence
in the systems themselves.
VI. UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT

The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act Drafting Committee, created
in 1997 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, initially explored various means of providing security in electronic
commerce, offering strong presumptions where certified digital signatures
81. New Zealand Law Commission, Report 50, Electronic Commerce Part One: A
Guide for the Legal and Business Community, at
334-335 (Mar. 15, 1999)
<http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/pubindex.html>.
82. "In our view, the needs of the market can be met by making a change to the
proposed Interpretation Act by including a definition of the term 'signature' to ensure that
electronic signatures are acceptable. This could follow the intent of article 7 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce." Id. at 344.
83. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 2. On April 7, 1999, after this article went to press, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws announce that the final form of these
rules would be in the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, and not a part of the
Uniform Commercial Code.
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were involved.85 Thus, in the beginning of the UETA deliberations, the
philosophy of the digital signature legislation was pursued: identifying
certain technological implementations and giving them special legal effect.
Serious skepticism was expressed at the first meetings, however, about the
appropriateness of this approach, and in particular about presumptions, for
many reasons, ranging from concerns about the implementation of digital
signature technology, to the lack of acknowledged standards of care of a
private key, to uncertain certification practices by CAs, and to unfairness of
the presumptions to less sophisticated parties. On the theory that market
practices were not sufficiently developed to permit evaluation of the
presumptions, the presumptions were weakened drastically,8 7 and the special
treatment for digital signatures was replaced with special treatment for
secure signatures. By July of 1998, however, the presumption language was
eliminated.88 No heightened effect was given to a message or record because
of its status as either a digital or "secure" signature.
There was, however, special treatment given where security procedures
were implemented. Under the provisions dealing with attribution, an
electronic message would be attributed to a person if another person, through
the application of a commercially reasonable security procedure, concluded
that it was that of the purported sender.8 9 Gone was any reference to specific
technologies, or criteria those technologies need to satisfy; as long as the
procedures were commercially reasonable, they were given special legal
effect. In essence, what started as a technological construct (specified
security procedures) evolved into a semi-technological construct (security
procedures satisfying specified criteria) and eventually into a commercial
law construct (commercially reasonable security procedure). Even that
85. The preliminary draft of the UETA was prepared in the spring of 1997 and
considered at an organizing meeting of the drafting committee in Dallas in May. See Uniform
Law

Commissioners,

Drafts

of

Uniform

and

Model

Acts

Official

Site,

<http://www.law.upenn.edubll/ulcuecictaecomm.htni>. It reflected some of the thinking in
both UNCrIRAL's deliberation and the Utah Act, offering strong presumptions that certified
digital signatures bound the purported signer (the person named in the certificate) to the
electronic record. Similar provisions appeared in the August 1997 draft.
86. See

Cem

Kaner,

The

Insecurity of

the

Digital Signature <http:ll

www.badsoftware.comldigsig.htm>.
87. The November 1997 draft of the UETA weakened the presumptions drastically; it
had borrowed concepts from Illinois, as had UNCITRAL at about the same time. Continued
concern about the presumptions led to the inclusion in the March 1998 draft of the UETA
three alternative definitions of a presumption, ranging from a "bursting bubble" approach,
where the proffering of any credible evidence destroys the presumption, to a shifting of the
burden of persuasion. See UETA § 102(a)(15) (Revised Draft Mar. 1998).
88. See Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (Proposed Draft July 1998).
89. See id. § 202. In turn, a security procedure was defined as a procedure required by
law, established by agreement, or knowingly adopted by each party. See id. § 102(a)(17).
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provision raised concerns, in large part for the same reasons that the
presumption language did, but in addition because of the vagueness and
uncertainty inherent in a "commercially reasonable" standard. Eventually,
this special treatment for commercially reasonable
security procedures was
9
also eliminated by the February 1999 draft.
Although, generally, the UETA eliminated presumptions, the February
1999 draft did contain one vestige of presumptions arising in the security
procedure context that proved to be controversial and was ultimately eliminated. Under that provision, if one party required the use of a security
procedure, that "requiring party" would be precluded from denying any messages sent pursuant to that security procedure.
In other words, an
irrebuttable presumption was created that the message came from the requiring party. 9 1 The other party, however, would not be precluded from
denying any messages under similar circumstances and would retain the
right to deny the message as its own.92 The theory of the section was to
"cast[ ] the risk of misattribution, and informational error on the party that is
responsible for a particular security procedure being used in a transaction. 9 3
The unintended consequence of this provision, however, was to discourage a
party from resorting to security procedures: it would appear to a party's
advantage never to require a security procedure-a result fundamentally at
odds with the type of behavior, i.e., the use of security procedures, one
would otherwise want to encourage. Even if a party were acting reasonably,
prudently, and in good faith in setting out security procedures, it could not
90. A memorandum prepared by the Chair and Reporter of the UETA Drafting
Committee outlined the reasons for eliminating the presumptions: "certainty and stability
regarding the predicate facts giving rise to the presumption" inherent in creation of statutory
presumptions is lacking; the vague formation of "commercially reasonable procedures" led to
uncertainty; and uncertainty was inherent in the development of the technologies.
Memorandum from Patricia Brumfield Fry and D. Benjamin Beard to NCCUSL
Commissioners (July 18, 1998) <http://www.webcom.comlegaled/ETAForum>. Technology
changes so rapidly that it is difficult to say, two years after a given transaction occurred, what
procedures were "commercially reasonable" at the time. Other considerations that were cited
include: the relative weakness and therefore meaninglessness of the "bursting bubble"
presumption (the presumption exists until denied by the other party), the concern about
creating a regime in which parties selected the medium for their transaction based on their
differing legal effects; the fact that presumptions would operate against the interests of
consumers and other unsophisticated parties; and the fact that presumptions might become a
rationale for other governments to regulate. Id. For a summary of the discussions at the
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act Drafting Committee meetings, see id.
91. UETA § 107(a) [Alternative 1] (Proposed Draft Feb. 1999). The other party must
have relied upon that message to trigger the presumption. Id.
92. Id. An alternative proposal would provide simply that "an agreement to be bound
by the results of a security procedure is unenforceable." Id. § 107(a) [Alternative 2].
93. Id. Reporter's Note.
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escape liability under this provision, even by contract.
Consequently, a
provision intended to encourage the use of security procedures arguably did
just the opposite, and it was eliminated by the UETA Drafting Committee at
its February 1999 meeting.
The current draft of the UETA, as it may be expected to be presented to the
National Conference, treats attribution in a very simple, straightforward manner.
An electronic message is attributed to a person "if the electronic record resulted
from the act of the person, or its electronic agent. '95 Once it is found that a
message or record is attributable to a person, attribution "has the effect Xrovided
for by law, regulation, or agreement regarding the security procedure." Under
this approach, attribution clearly is a factual matter;97 no preference is given to
any particular method of authentication or any particular security procedures, and
at the same time, freedom of contract is recognized. Thus, at least within the
context of the UETA, the view that there should not be any rule which would
provide a specific effect for any security procedure,98 whether it be an identified
security procedure, e.g., digital signatures, a security procedure agreed to by the
parties, or a security procedure which meets some predefined criteria, has carried
the day with regards to attribution.99
VII. ARTICLE 2B OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The proposed new Article 2B to the Uniform Commercial Code, whose
scope is limited to computer information transactions, was intended to forge
94. UETA § 107(b) (Proposed Draft Jan. 29, 1999) (stating the "provisions of this
section may not be varied by agreement"). Id.
95. Id. § 109(a).
96. See id. § 109(b). "'Security procedure' means a procedure employed for the
purpose of verifying that an electronic signature, record, or performance is that of a specific
person." Id. § 102(a)(18).
97. As a result, a certain security procedure may be effective to prove attribution at a
given point in time but will lose its efficacy with advances in technology, or with the ability of
hackers to demonstrate the vulnerability of systems.
98. See Letter from the Bank Working Group to D. Benjamin Beard and Patricia
Brumfield Fry (Feb. 12, 1999) (on file with the author). The Bank Working Group includes
Citigroup, The Chase Manhattan Bank, Visa International, Independent Bankers Association
of America, Consumer Bankers Association, The New York Clearing House Association,
L.L.C., and the Keybank National Association.
99. Under a parallel provision, § 111, an electronic signature "may be proven in any
manner, including by showing that the electronic signature was signed in conformity with a
security procedure for validating electronic signatures, or that a procedure existed by which
the person.., must have engaged in conduct or operations that signed the record or item in
order to proceed further in the processing of the transaction." UETA § 111 (Proposed Draft
Jan. 1999). Again, any presumptions arising from the use of a particular security method are
removed. Id.
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the rules for electronic contracting that would provide the base for the
remaining articles of the Code.1° Although the UETA has gone to great
lengths to eliminate presumptions and to eliminate any special treatment
arising from the use of security procedures, the Article 2B Drafting
Committee has taken the position that such treatment is important and that if
security procedures are present, that treatment encourages the use of security
procedures and promotes electronic commerce.
Article 2B begins with the traditional rule that the person asserting that
a record is that of another person has the burden of proof of attribution. 10 1
Special legal effect is given, however, to the implementation of security
procedures, or what Article 2B calls an "attribution procedure." 1°2 If the
parties agree to, or otherwise adopt, an attribution procedure' 0 3 which is
used by the parties, the attribution procedure is commercially reasonable,
and the recipient "relies on or accepts" the message, then the recipient has
met its burden of attributing the message to the sender." 4 The only way the
purported sender may avoid attribution is to prove the message was not
caused by: 1) someone entrusted by the sender with the right to act on its
behalf; 2) someone who gained access to the transmitting facilities of the
sender; or 3) someone who obtained, from a source controlled by the
purported sender, information facilitating breach of the attribution
procedure. ° 5 Even if the purported sender is able to overcome
this hurdle, it
6
might still be held liable under negligence-type principles.1
The foundation, then, of Article 2B's rules is the presence of a
"commercially reasonable" ' 0 7 attribution procedure, a concept that had its
100. Although that was the intent, the Article 2 Drafting Committee voted at its
February 1999 meeting to adopt a minimalist approach, more akin to Article 2B, rather than
following Article 2B's approach. That decision was ratified by the Article 2 Drafting
Committee at its last meeting in March of 1999. Thus, the Article 2 Drafting Committee has
stopped short of adopting the Article 2B provisions discussed above.
101. See U.C.C. art. 2B-116(c) (Proposed Draft Feb. 1, 1999), available at
<http:www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc.htm>.
102. An attribution procedure is defined as "a procedure established by law, regulation,
or agreement, or a procedure otherwise adopted by the parties, [to verify] that an electronic
message.., is that of a specific person." See id. at § 2B-102(a)(3).
103. See id. at § 2B-116(c). At its February meeting, the Article 2B Drafting
Committee discussed a clarification that the attribution procedure must have been
"knowingly" adopted. Id.
104. Id.
105. See id. at § 2B-116(c)(3) (Proposed Draft Feb. 1, 1999) available at
<http:www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc.htm>.
106. Under U.C.C. § 2B-1 16(e), a purported sender is liable for reliance losses if those
losses occurred as a result of the purported sender's failure to exercise reasonable care with
regard to the attribution procedures. U.C.C. § 2B-1 16(e).

107. See, e.g., id.
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genesis in the "security procedure" provisions of Article 4A on funds
transfers. 10 8 Once the presence of such a procedure is established, then the
recipient of the message has carried its burden of establishing that the
message originated with the identified sender. The theory is that such a
standard makes it easier for recipients of messages to "prove up" those
messages in court, and as a result, more people will implement commercially
reasonable security procedures, and confidence in the systems will increase.
Those favoring presumptions' °9 of this nature frequently invoke the
precedent of Article 4A and its treatment of commercially reasonable
security procedures. Crucial differences exist between the two formulations,
however. First, Article 4A applies only where there has been an "agreed"
security procedure. Indeed, under Article 4A, the notion of a "commercially
reasonable security procedure" acts as a limitation on the ability of the
parties to alter traditional rules governing proof of attribution: a contractual
agreement will be recognized only if the agreed procedure is commercially
reasonable. Thus, Article 4A is not a recognition that certain security
procedures should be given special legal effect, but a recognition that the
ability of the parties to agree-and, in particular, the ability of a bank to shift
the liability for an unauthorized message to its customer-is limited.
While Article 4A only applies where there has been an "agreed"
security procedure, Article 2B applies to any attribution procedure
"otherwise [knowingly] adopted by the parties."' 10 According to the drafters
of Article 2B, the provision on attribution "enables electronic commerce in
an open environment, while stating reasonable standards to allocate risk." '
108. See Boss, supra note 4. Article 4A on funds transfers defines a security procedure
as "a procedure established by agreement of a customer and a receiving bank for the purpose
of (i) verifying that a payment order or communication amending or canceling a payment
order is that of the customer, or (ii) detecting error in the transmission or the content of the
payment order or communication." U.C.C. § 4A-201. For the definition of an "attribution
procedure," see supra note 102. The relevance of Article 4A as a precedent in other areas of
electronic commerce has, however, been called into question in large part because of
distinctions between the types of transactions subject to Article 4A and those subject to the
provisions of either Article 2B or the UETA. See Boss, supra note 9, at 1079-80, 1083.
109. The February 1999 draft of § 2B-116 spoke in terms of use of attribution
procedures "creat[ing] a presumption" of attribution. U.C.C. § 2B-1 16 (Proposed Draft Feb.
1, 1999). At its February meeting, the Drafting Committee accepted a proposal put forward by
Chair Carlyle C. Ring, Jr. and Reporter Raymond Nimmer to modify the language to speak in

terms of who has the burden of establishing attribution or non-attribution.

See

<http://www.2Bguide.com/docs/299t4.html>. The effect of the proposal was to remove the
problem of characterizing the type of presumption (bursting bubble, burden of going forward,
burden of persuasion), but in effect, the language utilizes the strongest of rebuttable
presumptions: the burden is that of establishing the negative.
110. U.C.C. § 2B-102(a)(3) (Proposed Draft Feb. 1, 1999).
111. Id. § 2B-1 16, Reporter's Note 1.
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It is clear that the Article 2B drafters were concerned about parties who were
not otherwise in privity with each other:
"Electronic commerce is
anonymous in character and depends upon such procedures and their
recognition in law and practice.'
The absence of any requirement of an
agreement has important ramifications. At least where there is an agreement
between the parties as to the relevant procedures to be followed, a party is
arguably on notice that all parties to the transaction will rely on those
procedures. Because of the vague reference in Article 2B to procedures
"otherwise adopted by the parties,"'1 3 such notice is arguably lacking.
Moreover, under the required agreement under Article 4A, the customer
unwilling to assume fraud risks had the ability to protect itself by shifting the
burden back to the bank or requiring the bank to take additional
procedures, 14 an ability lacking under Article 2B.
A second crucial difference is the practical ability of the alleged sender
of a message to overcome the presumption in light of the nature of the
transaction and in light of the state of technology. If a person adopts a PIN
or other attribution method for doing business on the Internet, it will find
that if a message is sent utilizing that PIN, the person will be liable for that
message unless it can invoke the provisions setting forth how the
presumption is overcome. Consequently, rather than the burden being on the
recipient to prove who sent the message, the burden is now on the alleged
sender to prove it did not send the message and that the message did not
originate from anyone who gained access through the alleged sender.
Proving a negative is difficult. In the context of Article 4A, however,
the rationale was explained as follows:
Because of bank regulation requirements, in this kind of case
[wire transfer fraud,] there will always be a criminal investigation
as well as an internal investigation of the bank to determine the
probable explanation for the breach of security. Because a funds
transfer fraud usually will involve a very large amount of money,
both the criminal investigation and the internal investigation are
likely to be thorough. In some cases there may be an investigation
by bank examiners as well. Frequently, these investigations will
develop evidence of who is at fault and the cause of the loss. The
customer will have access to evidence developed in these
112. Id. § 2B-102, Reporter's Note 2.
113. Id. § 2B-102(a)(3).
114. See U.C.C. § 4A-203, cmt. 3 ("A customer may want to protect itself by imposing
limitations on acceptance of payment orders by the bank"). Id. "Some customers may be
unwilling to take all or part of the risk of loss with respect to unauthorized payment orders
even if all of the requirements of Section 4A-202(b) are met." Id. § 4A-203, cmt. 6.
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can be used by the customer in
investigations and that evidence
11 5
meeting its burden of proof.

proof will be
Unfortunately, access to such rigorous investigation and
6
lacking in the typical transactions covered by Article 2B.1
Third, Article 2B adopts an additional ground for shifting risks: if the
person alleged to have sent the message can nonetheless prove that it did not
send the message-a somewhat difficult task to begin with-that person may
still be liable for losses "in the nature of the cost of performance of the other
party" 117 if the loss occurred because: 1) the purported sender failed to
exercise reasonable care; 2) the other party reasonably relied on the belief
that the purported sender sent the message; and 3) the fraudulent third party
who used the attribution procedure gained access to it from a source under
The net result is that it may well be
the control of the purported sender.
impossible for an alleged sender to avoid attribution under Article 2B. 119
VIII. INTO THE BREACH: LEGISLATING FOR SECURITY

When the UETA Drafting Committee was first established, the
assumption, and, indeed, the mandate given to that committee, was to avoid
inconsistency with the revisions being proposed to the Uniform Commercial
Code, and, in particular, Article 2B. Theory, however, has diverged from
practice, as illustrated by Article 2B's adoption of a presumption approach,
and its not-so-hidden desire to go beyond mere removal of barriers to
115. U.C.C. § 4A-203, cmt. 5.
116. The difficulties in proving a negative raise another issue: the burden on the party
attempting to avoid liability arguably is the same (to prove the message did not come from a
source controlled by that party) regardless of the security procedure at issue. Yet not all
technological security procedures are created equal; what they involve, what they prove, and
the strength of their proof vary. Even "digital signatures" come in different strengths: the
longer the number used to generate the key pair, the harder it is to crack the code, and the
shorter the number, the easier it is. Yet all commercially reasonable security procedures are
treated equally with respect to the presumption.
117. U.C.C. § 2B-116 (Proposed Draft Feb. 1, 1999).
118. Id. For a history of the evolution of this provision and its source in both Article
4A and the UNCITIRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, see Boss, supra note 4, at
1961-63.
119. Take the situation of a person who has attribution procedures resident on an office
computer and locks the office to attend a weekend meeting, where there are ample witnesses to
confirm that it was physically impossible to send the message at issue. Proof that it was
physically impossible for that person to send the message would not be sufficient to satisfy the
burden of establishing that the electronic message was not caused by anyone entrusted by that
person with the office, someone who gained access to the office, or someone who gained
information facilitating breach from that person.

Published by NSUWorks, 1999

31

Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 3

616

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 23:583

actively supporting electronic commerce, and the rejection of that approach
in the JETA. According to the Chair and the Reporter for the UETA,
"perhaps the most significant difference between the UETA and Article 2B
when security procedures are
relate[s] to the creation of presumptions
' 12 °
agreement.
an
to
parties
by
employed
These differences continue despite attempts to harmonize the
approaches between those two drafts; the only agreement is continued
disagreement.12 1 "In light of the different character and scope of the
respective drafts, it was agreed that the different approach in the two drafts
can be justified.' 122 What is far from evident'2 3 is what differences in
character and scope justify the difference in approach to presumptions.
Although it is true that Article 2B has a narrower scope than the UETA in
that it applies only to certain informational contracts while the UETA
potentially applies to any contracts entered into online, the reality is that
under both, there is a wide range of sophistication in the parties potentially
subject to their provisions, and under both, identical arguments may be made
about the need to support electronic commerce. The only conclusion that
can be drawn is that each Drafting Committee has a different view about the
relationship between the law and security.
On one hand, the philosophy of the UETA is the minimalist approach:
as long as the law recognizes and enforces electronic transactions,
businesses gain some "security" in their commercial dealings. The role of
law in technology is enabling, not promotional of certain technologies, nor
channeling, encouraging certain procedures. This approach recognizes that
"technological security" is not monolithic: there are many technological
methods of security, with different strengths and weaknesses, and
technology is in a constant stage of development.124 Thus, promoting certain
technologies or certain implementations would be counterproductive. This
approach also recognizes that the law is of limited utility in encouraging
120. Memorandum, supra note 90.
121. Each Drafting Committee reaffirmed its own approach, and rejected that of the
other, in its last meeting in February 1999.
122. Memorandum from Patricia B. Fry, UETA Drafting Committee Chair, and Carlyle
C. Ring, Jr., U.C.C. Article 2B Drafting Committee Chair, to the UETA and Article 2B
Drafting Committees (Jan. 29, 1999) <http://www.2Bguide.comdocs/199pfcr.html>.
123. This is true even to one who is both on the Article 2B Drafting Committee and the
official American Bar Association Advisor to the UETA Drafting Committee. The statement
may simply be a recognition that different drafting committees, dealing with different subject
matters, came up with different solutions.
124. "While a number of participants argued that fairly strong presumptions are
necessary to promote electronic commerce, others felt that the state of technology and current
market are still too underdeveloped to warrant the creation of any presumptions."
Memorandum, supra note 90.
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certain types of behavior: people will use security procedures because it is
good business, not because the law gives special legal effects if they are
used. The marketplace, rather than the legislature, provides the incentives
and support. The UETA does not view the law as the sole or even primary
source of security; instead, it recognizes that the entire technological, legal,
and social structure contributes to that security.
On the other hand is the view that the law has an important role in
providing "security" in electronic commerce; that the law can indeed
"legislate" security by providing certain benefits to those who use the
available technology. Article 2B, following the lead of Article 4A,12
represents the position that statutory provisions that recognize those security
procedures can encourage use of security procedures. 126 By assuring parties
involved in "electronic commerce" of the ability to enforce transactions in
which reasonable security procedures are used, the law creates user
confidence and ultimately supports and promotes the use of electronic
commerce.
Each approach has its critics. The minimalist approach, limited to the
removal of barriers, has been criticized as not giving the user of technology
the degree of assurance necessary. Critics emphasize that simply saying
electronic messages "may" suffice or are equivalent to writings and
signatures is insufficient; users want to know what will suffice.
Consequently, it is asserted that the legislation must lay out the indicia of
assurance and certainty necessary for the electronic messages to be deemed
reliable.' 27
The question, however, is whether the Article 2B approach gives any
greater certainty or any greater assurances than the minimalist approach. In
giving special effect when commercially reasonable security procedures are
present, what must be asked is whether Article 2B has met the goals of
125. Article 4A theorized that losses due to fradulent payment orders can best be
avoided by the use of commercially reasonable security procedures, and that the use of such
procedures should be encouraged. U.C.C. § 4A-203, cmt. 3. The rules designed to "protect
both the customer and the receiving bank," were aimed at providing such encouragement. Id.
Thus, the customer may not be held liable unless commercially reasonable security procedures
are agreed to, and the bank is protected if they are agreed to and are implemented. Id.
126. As one letter put it: "Given the limited experience with electronic commerce,
NCCUSL should gravitate towards general legal principles that provide incentives for, and
reward the use of, commercially reasonableand agreed procedures that give courts a basis to
select and adjust to the facts of individual cases." Memorandum from Business Software
Alliance to Article 2B Drafting Committee (Jan. 20, 1999) <http://www.2B
guide.com/docs/0119bsa.html>. Of course, as discussed, Article 2B goes well beyond
agreement.
127. See Michael S. Baum, Linking Security and the Law of Computer-Based
Commerce <http://www.verisign.com>.
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"security:" more certainty and predictability in the application of the law;
greater assurances of the validity of the transaction; encouragement of the
use of security procedures; and more faith or trust in the systems.
It is questionable whether, as currently articulated, Article 2B
contributes to the certainty and predictability in the application of the law.
The factual nature of the commercially reasonable standard1 2 renders it
vague and subjective in nature, 1 9 a result which "could hardly have been
more inconsistent with the drafters' statement that 'the parties ... transfer
need to be able to predict risk with certainty.' 130 It is true that in the context
of funds transfers, the same test has been used, but the funds transfer
situation differs.'
Determining
is "commercially reasonable" in an
industry where there is a developedwhat
body of commercial practices,
where the
128. U.C.C. § 2B-114 (Proposed Draft Feb. 1, 1999) ("commercial reasonableness is
[to be] determined in light of the purposes of the procedure and the commercial circumstances
at the time the parties agree to or adopt the procedure."); id ("How one gauges commercial
reasonableness depends on a variety of factors, including the agreement, the choices of the
parties, the then current technology, the types of transactions affected by the procedure,
sophistication of the parties, volume of similar transactions engaged in, availability of feasible
alternatives, cost and difficulty of utilizing alternative procedures, and procedures in general
use for similar types of transaction."). Id., Reporter's Note 4.
129. This objection has been made on both the domestic level as well as on the
international level (where the concepts of "reasonableness" and "commercial reasonableness"
generally do not have the same level of acceptance as they do within the United States). See
letter from Paul Shupack, Paul S. Turner, and Jane K. Winn (Jan. 20, 1999)
<http://www.2Bguide.com/>.
130. Id. (citing Official Comment to Section 4A-102).
131. In the Article 4A context, the use of the phrase was justified on the grounds that to
the extent one goal of Article 4A was to shield banks from potential catastrophic losses by
shifting some wire fraud risks to customers, the "commercially reasonable security procedure"
requirement was one way of achieving a balance by limiting the bank's ability to shift the risk
in egregious circumstances. According to that line of argument, the national interest of
protecting recipients of messages from catastrophic losses (which was present in the bank
regulation arena) is absent in the more generic area of electronic commerce. Thus, a device
(the requirement of a commercially reasonable security procedure) which was originally
adopted to protect customers from a rule of absolute liability is now being invoked to impose
liability. See Letter from Shupack, Turner, & Winn, supra note 126.
This description of the intent of the "reasonable security procedure" requirement of
Article 4A has been disputed by the Chair of the Article 2B Drafting Committee, who also
chaired the Article 4A Drafting Committee. Memorandum of Carlyle C. Ring, Jr. (Jan. 25,
1999) <http://www.2Bguide.com>. His account points out that, in its application, Article 4A
places the risk of unauthorized orders on the bank; the bank is only able to shift that risk to the
customer if it finds that commercially reasonable security procedures are used. While his
argument correctly interprets the language and structure of Article 4A as it currently existed, it
does not respond to the argument that the alternative in Article 4A was to shield banks from
liability by placing all risks on the customer.
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parties belong to a relatively closed community of players, and where the
major participants are either large, sophisticated commercial parties or banks
subject to strict regulatory oversight 32 is a different burden than proving
what is "commercially reasonable" when such factors are absent. In other
words, although benefits are intended to flow from the use of "commercially

reasonble" security procedures, the introduction of notions of "commercial
reasonableness" is a serious qualification on the legal construct that weakens

its usefulness as a guiding beacon for business.133 Thus, according benefits
when "commercially reasonable" security procedures are used may not
provide the type of "security" that the industry is seeking, given the
vagueness and uncertainty inherent in the formulation and the difficulty in
determining whether a particular procedure may be commercially reasonable
under the circumstances.
Just as it is questionable whether the goal of "certainty" is met, it is also
questionable whether Article 2B gives the user any greater assurances than
would exist under the UETA. To get the benefit of the beneficial treatment
accorded by the statute, the proponent would still have to prove that there
was a method adopted by the parties to authenticate the message as that of
the sender, that the method adopted did operate as an authentication device,
and that under the circumstances of the transaction, it in fact operated
reasonably as an authentication device. In other words, to get the benefit of
the statute, the recipient would have to prove essentially the same set of facts
one would normally need to prove attribution directly. 134 Thus, it is doubtful
132. Boss, supra note 9, at 1079-80, 1083.
133. Of course, to the extent a vague standard of "commercial reasonableness" falls far
short of laying out the indicia of assurance and certainty necessary for reliability, one could
argue for more specificity in the type of security procedures sanctioned by the law. To the
extent a specific technological implementation does indeed provide assurances of reliability, it
is argued that implementation should be given greater efficacy under the law. This can be
accomplished through statutory or legal provisions treating these more secure methods as
conclusively satisfying signature and writing requirements and as providing evidence of
source and identity of the sender, as well as the integrity of the content of the message. The
more detail and "indicia," however, one lays out in a statute, the more regulatory and binding
the scheme becomes. Also, there is less flexibility with respect to emerging technologies and
implementations and the needs of the parties.
134. That is not the case where there is an agreement: then all the recipient would need
to prove was the agreement itself and compliance with its procedures. Similarly, where there
is a specific statute or regulation validating a specific technological method of authentication,
all that the recipient would need to prove is that the specified method was used. The proof
issues become complicated when the recipient must prove "commercially reasonable
attribution procedures," as is the case with Article 2B, or when it must prove that the method
used qualifies as a "secure electronic signature," the approach followed in Illinois and in the
proposed UNCITRAL legislation.
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whether the "commercially reasonable security procedure" standard at all
helps the litigant with her burden of proof.
The goal of encouraging the use of security procedures is also
troublesome, and the risk exists that the statutory scheme may actually
operate as a disincentive. As was observed in the context of the UETA, a
rule placing the risk of loss on the person requiring use of a specified
security procedure might indeed discourage people from designating certain
procedures; 135 a variation of this provision in Article 2B136was deleted at the
Drafting Committee's last meeting for this very reason. The same question
can be raised about the other provisions in Article 2B with regard to
attribution: does adopting presumptions that make it easier for one party to
prove a transaction in court, while at the same time making it difficult, if not
impossible, for the other party to disprove the transaction, result in
encouraging or discouraging the use of security procedures? No special
proof rules exist, for example, in the context of phone orders or mail orders,
yet those businesses thrive. Article 2B's rule encourages recipients of
messages to use "commercially reasonable attribution procedures" by giving
them statutory incentives, but it does not provide similar incentives to
potential senders of electronic messages. Indeed, the rules may arguably
discourage potential senders from adopting certain methods of
communication for fear of having liability imposed, in actions with
strangers, where the alleged sender did not send the message.137 If, indeed,
part of the problem is that people are concerned about the "unknown" and
the potential of unintended liability, rules such as this feed rather than
assuage their fears.
Additionally, Article 2B takes the view that by providing those benefits,
one in turn increases the confidence of those doing business electronically
because they can now reasonably rely on receipt of electronic messages from
strangers. This view of security and its relationship to the law assumes that
the value and security added to electronic commerce in this manner is both
appropriate and acceptable. As noted above, however, that security may be
illusory. First, to the extent that potential users of the technology are
discouraged from its use because of fear of potential liability, their
confidence in the system is decreased. More importantly, however,
whatever confidence flows from the use of security procedures in electronic
commerce arguably comes not from the knowledge that the law gives the
135. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
136. U.C.C. § 2B- 115 (Proposed Draft Feb. 1, 1999).
137. Consumer representatives, for example, have pointed out that the credit card
scheme that currently exists protects consumers in the case of fraud or unauthorized use of
their cards, while in contrast, an Article 2B approach in the consumer context would protect
the merchant. The UETA approach is to favor neither party.
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users benefits but from the knowledge that the technological
implementations themselves are trustworthy.
On the federal level, several agencies have noted the need to avoid
allocations of risk at a time when electronic commerce is still evolving.
Thus, the Federal Reserve Board, considering the question of stored value
cards, noted:
Economic theory and empirical evidence suggest that government
regulation has the potential to foster or hinder technological
progress and the development of new products by influencing
private sector incentives to invest in research and development
activities and private sector choices among alternative
technologies. In deciding whether and, if so, how to regulate...
policymakers must carefully assess the potential effect of their
decisions on the evolution of these new38 products and the extent to
which they achieve market acceptance.1
In similar words, the White House, which had previously urged governments
to avoid undue regulation of the market, 39 urged flexibility in the drafting of
electronic commerce laws, in large part to prevent unwarranted market
distortion. This is expressed in the following:
The market is very much in the early stages of experimentation
with respect to business models for electronic commerce. The
United States believes it is not wise at this time to attempt to
identify a single model that these transactions will use or to
develop a legal environment using a single model. Indeed, such an
approach would prevent the market from testing different possible
approaches and prematurely impose a particular model on all
electronic commerce, inevitably limiting its growth. Therefore, at
the current state of development, the legal framework should
support a variety of business models so that the market is able to
experiment and select4 the models that best fit particular types of
electronic commerce.1 0

138. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report to the Congress on the
Application of the Electronic Funds TransferAct to Electronic Stored-Value Products (Mar.

1997) <http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/boarddocs/RptCongress/efta-rpt.pdf>.
139. See supra note 30.

140. U.S Government Working Group on Electronic Commerce, First Annual Report
(Nov. 1998) <http:llwww.doc.gov/ecommerce/E-comm.pdf>.
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IX. CONCLUSION

No one disputes the fact that security issues in electronic commerce,
both of the technological and non-technological kind, are extremely
important. This is true even of those who adhere to the notion that the law
should, at this stage, simply remove barriers but otherwise stay neutral on the
subject. Indeed, security is one of the primary concerns that should be
addressed by businesses migrating to electronic communication and
Thus, in the case of agreements between businesses
businesses online.
doing electronic commerce, it makes sense to go beyond merely requiring
"reasonable security procedures" to explain in specific detail what
procedures are required,14 2 and where the agreement is specific as to the
effects to be given to the use of those procedures, it makes sense to give
deference to that agreement. Similarly, the development of industry
standards and codes of conduct addressing security is of extreme
importance. 4 3 Industry codes and standards operate to inform business
people as to the variety of technological security means at their disposal,
thereby empowering them to make intelligent choices. This type of
education clearly gives the businesses a sense of security.
The real questions go to the relationship between the law and these
"security" issues: what type of "legal security" is necessary? Should the
law set forth a legal regime specific to certain technologies or
implementations, providing certain benefits when that technology is used?
While it may be true that certain technological security procedures are
"uniquely suited to the needs of secure e-commerce, ' 1 two key points
141. See supra note 21, cmt. 1 (1990) ("Adequate security procedures are
recognized... as critical to the efficacy of electronic communication ....The use of adequate
security enhances the reliability of those records and enhances the ability to prove the
substantive terms of any underlying commercial transaction.").
142. See, e.g., Model Electronic Payments Agreement and Commentary at § 7, cmt. 5;
32 JURIMETRICS J. 601, 654 (1992) ("in certain situations a lack of specificity in defining
.reasonable' security procedures may provide inadequate guidance causing such security
procedures to fail in their intended purpose. Specificity may help the parties implement and
comply decisively and unambiguously with security procedures, reduce confusion and offer
better expectations of reliability and certainty. Security procedures should be sufficiently
precise so that they are not subject to discretionary, self-serving interpretation").
143. See Information Security Committee, Section of Science and Technology,
American Bar Association, Digital Signature Guidelines: Legal Infrastructure for
Certification Authorities and Secure Electronic Commerce (1996) <http://www.abanet.
org/scitech/ec/isc/home.html >.
144. This claim, often made of digital signatures within a public key infrastructure, see
Baum, supra note 46, has been disputed both because it assumes all implementations of the
technology are the same when they are not, and it ignores other technological security
procedures such as biometrics.
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remain. First, while certain types of technology today may be considered
sufficiently secure to merit special treatment, future technological advances
raise the possibility that: 1) methods of security currently used may cease to
be secure in the future; and 2) other methods of security and other modes of
technological implementation will provide comparable or even better means
of security. Given the time lags inherent in the updating of laws, 45 drafting
a technology-specific or implementation-specific body of rules may not be
prudent. 46 Drafting a more general body of rules that depend upon such
concepts as "commercially reasonable security procedures" or that set out
criteria that security procedures must satisfy present a different problem: the
creation of a legal regime lacking the certainty desired by many business
people.
The theory that these laws "encourage" the use of security procedures is
questionable. If indeed certain technological security techniques are
uniquely situated to the needs of secure electronic commerce, they may well
be implemented without the adoption of specific rules. "One compelling
example of the dramatic success of open PKI is the ubiquitous use of the
SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) protocol over shared paths such as the Internet
for e-commerce."' 147 That proposition, while asserted as evidence of the need
for PKI specific legislation, arguably proves the opposite: if there is a good,
secure method of doing electronic commerce, that method will be
implemented as a matter of sound business practices, not as the result of PKI
specific legislation. In other words, the technology implementation itself
provides the necessary security and certainty necessary
for electronic
148
intervention.
legislative
for
need
the
without
commerce
145. The need to revise our domestic and international laws to accommodate electronic
commerce has been a theme for well over a decade, yet we are still attempting to address that

need through statutory enactment.
146. Cf.C. Bradford Biddle, LegislatingMarket Winners: DigitalSignature Laws and
the ElectronicCommerce Marketplace, 34 SAN DiEGO L. REv. 1225 (1997).

147. Baum, supra note 124, at 38. According to Baum, the total number of sites using
SSL has risen from 486 in the third quarter of 1996, to 104,760 in the third quarter with a
projected rise in the fourth quarter" of 1999 to 307,206. The total number of sessions, as
opposed to sites, has similarly increased during that period from 291,600 to 134,775,517, and
is projected to rise to 636,335,396. Id.
148. An example lies within the development of the SET protocol, which involves the
use of digital signatures in the credit card system. MasterCard and Visa, who under current
arrangements potentially bear the risk of fraudulent transactions, charge their participating
merchants a percentage based ,on the risk involved in particular transactions, e.g., the rate
assessed for telephone order charges is much higher than the rate assessed in transactions
evidenced by both the card imprint and card holder signature. They have announced,
however, that when the SET protocol is implemented in the credit card system, and,
presumably, the risks of fraud drop, they will lower their merchant discount rate by several
percent. Thus, the benefits of security implementation are being realized not through the
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The difficulty with much of this debate over whether or not to recognize
specific means of technological security is that the discussion is misplaced.
If the technology provides reasonable means of security, people will
implement the technology for that reason, not because the law says so. A
person who installs locks on his or her door does not do so because greater
legal protection is afforded those who use the technology; a person installs
locks because experience has shown that locks are one means of stopping
intruders. A business that requires checks to be signed by more than one
officer does so not because the law requires but because it is a good business
practice that reduces risks of fraud, and a bank which institutes the practice
of manually examining the signatures on checks over a given amount does so
not because the law requires it but because it is a prudent banking practice to
reduce risk of fraud. The economic and other benefits to be gained from
implementation of secure systems is not disputed; what is disputed is the
need for the law to enact legislation saying that these secure systems are
secure and therefore are entitled to special treatment. Such legislation may
be neither needed nor wise.
There is no doubt that "security" in electronic commerce is an
important issue, but the debate over electronic signature legislation is
misleading in that it fails to recognize that security is more than merely the
legal effects to be given to certain technological security techniques. Once
we recognize that fundamental point, we can place the discussions about
what type of legislation is necessary and appropriate in perspective and
evaluate the claims for what they are worth.

enactment of any legislation but through marketplace recognition of the risk reduction
additional technological security brings.
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